This first of three papers in our series on materiality in credit ratings will examine the materiality of credit ratings from an "implied materiality" and governance disclosure perspective. In the second paper, we will explore the materiality of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in credit ratings' methodologies and introduce the concept of "layered materiality." In the third paper, we will evaluate current and potential credit rating agency (CRA) business models based on our analysis in the previous papers, and introduce the concept of "institutionalized materiality." Starting with this paper, and in the rest of the series, we will also recommend how the credit rating model can be enhanced in the coming years to help build more sustainable credit markets.
Introduction
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) can play a vital role in ensuring fair, transparent, and efficient capital allocation through the provision of independent and unbiased ordinal ranking of the quality of debt issues.
2 These ratings influence financial contracts, investment decisions, and securities regulations. Such rating assessments are a precondition to informed investor decisionmaking in regard to the trillions of dollars of corporate and sovereign debt securities annually brought to the bond market.
3
In this paper we use the lens of materiality to take up the call for a deeper debate into the principles underlying the methodologies and business models of CRAs. Materiality defines the "reportability" boundary of economic, environmental, social, and governance (risk) issues, and identifies which issues receive the most resources and management attention. 4 It is a concept that is at the core of financial, sustainability, and integrated reporting. In the U.S., financial reporting materiality guidance is provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in case law. 5 Materiality is a social construct that is entity-specific and audience-dependent; it is based on the judgment and oversight of the board of directors of the firm. 6 While a fundamental but elusive concept in corporate reporting, materiality has yet to enter the longstanding debate about the role of CRAs in the financial markets. CRAs are both producers and consumers of materiality determinations. Thus, clarity in how CRAs describe the process by which they determine materiality is of critical importance to both the governance of their own firms and to the ratings products they bring to the financial markets.
We will argue that claims by CRAs about the independent and unbiased nature of their ratings are material information and should be included in their own disclosures. We will also argue that these claims represent the "implied materiality" of their ratings in the sense that investors making investment decisions regard independent ratings as an important part of the total mix of decision-relevant information, including investors evaluating the CRAs' own corporate disclosure information.
To summarize our conclusions, serious questions exist regarding the implied materiality of credit ratings as currently practiced. From an examination of their Form 10-K disclosures about their ratings products, we will show that CRAs have potential governance shortcomings that need to be addressed by the boards of the CRAs themselves. We will recommend ways to address these shortcomings. Our recommended CRA governance remedies aim to restore credit rating institutions to their historic role in the proper functioning of the global capital markets. This paper is organized into five sections. After this introduction, section two discusses the role of credit rating agencies and introduces the concept of "implied materiality." Section three discusses the issue of material disclosures by CRAs regarding their ratings product. Section four analyzes the disclosures of McGraw Hill Financial (McGraw Hill), the owner of Standard & Poors, and of Moody's, the owner of Moody's Investor Service, the world's two largest CRAs.
Section five concludes with initial recommendations to move CRAs and their methodologies toward more rigorous attention to materiality and, finally, previews the papers that will follow.
The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Financial Markets
The U.S. bond market has been larger than the stock market at year-end for 24 of the last 25 years, on average 79% larger.
7 From 2000-2007, the bond market grew at a faster rate than the economy and doubled in size, 8 primarily due to the advent of asset-backed securities, which created a huge secondary market for securitized consumer debt. Since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, however, the pattern of debt growth has changed. Sovereign debt has grown more robustly, while corporate debt growth is more mixed. The U.S. "Treasuries market increased from about $5 trillion to $11 trillion from the end of 2007 through 2012."
9
Credit rating agencies play an essential role in the bond market. The ratings they provide are assessments, in the form of rankings, of the riskiness of debt issues, i.e., the likelihood that the bondholder will continue to receive interest payments and recover his or her principal. Bond ratings affect the cost of capital of the bond issuer in inverse proportion -the higher the rating, the lower the issuer's cost of capital. It is a practical reality that most corporate bonds, assetbacked securities and other bond classes need to be rated by a CRA. terms of the number of ratings and revenues (Table 1) . This is effectively an oligopoly with the position of these three organizations further strengthened by the fact that many debt instruments include "ratings triggers". CRA's reviews of previously issued ratings may result in ratings upgrades or downgrades possibly activating the trigger feature of the debt issue.
Borrowers are willing to include such triggers because, without them [or without CRAs' prior ratings reviews], lenders, out of fear of event risk, would demand a higher initial spread on debt contracts, or may not be willing to lend as much. Hence, issuers that are downgraded below investment grade to speculative grade see their cost of capital increase and their financing options diminish. The extent by which credit ratings from the global rating agencies are embedded in regulations and contracts is such that even investors that are not bound by these may have to react substantially to a downgrade to a speculative grade.
ratings of corporate issuers and 90.3% of those of asset-backed securities (Table 3) . Clearly, the quality of the ratings work by the Big Three is critical for protecting the integrity of the bond markets.
In concept of relevance. As a social construct, thinking about "material to whom" is essential in determining materiality. 16 Audience matters.
The core issue surrounding the materiality of credit ratings in terms of their primary audience -providers of financial capital (investors) -is that credit ratings are assumed to be independent and unbiased and, as such, are of commercial value to these same investors. This effectively places credit ratings in the same category as the financial disclosures made by a company itself, giving them "implied materiality." The material financial disclosures of a public company are based on well-established accounting standards used by independent audit firms to provide an audit opinion on the company's financial statements. In the U.S., under the Sarbanes- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also charges the audit committee with resolving disagreements between the auditors and management: "The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the board of directors, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and each such registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee." Sarbanes- shown how "A trusted and independent third party -a CRA -can help to reduce this information friction" in the market failure case of the uninformed investor vs. the informed investor. 20 Independent and unbiased ratings are, by implication, material to investors.
The special status of NRSRO CRAs as a solution to market failure derives from the representations they make in maintaining their registration with the SEC. 21 Absent their independent and unbiased nature, CRAs' ratings would be of limited value to investors, thus limiting the value of the firm providing the rating. They would also have limited value to the company being rated, which is the entity that pays for the rating under the current "issuer-pays" model.
Disclosures Regarding the Materiality of Credit Ratings
Owing to this combination of the practical necessity for credit ratings for nearly all debt securities, government designation, investor expectations, and expectations of the rated entity, it is the fiduciary duty of the board of directors of a CRA, or an entity which owns a CRA, to ensure that the company is making the necessary material disclosures regarding the independent and unbiased nature of the ratings. 22 What is material depends upon which audience(s) the board deems to be particularly significant. In the case of CRAs, at least three audiences are clearly significant:
driving out the good." Hidden or withheld information creates the market failure of information asymmetry and can also lead to the market failure of adverse selection. Recommended solutions to these market failures are mandatory information disclosure. 
Investors in CRAs:
The decision of whether or not to invest in a CRA, or a company that owns one, will be influenced by claims regarding the independent and unbiased qualities of ratings' products. The implied materiality of credit ratings' claims about whether or not these ratings are independent and unbiased is part of the "total mix" of information considered in making an investment decision.
23
2. Investors in rated debt: A credit rating which is independent and unbiased carries implied materiality and thus belongs in the "total mix" of all other material information used in deciding whether or not to buy a given debt security at a specific price. Whether or not ratings are independent and unbiased is significant to issuers. They also pay for the ratings. If the products do not meet the criteria of being independent and unbiased, the rationale for paying for these ratings is dramatically reduced, even though in most cases issuers have little practical choice but to purchase these ratings. This raises the issue of "institutionalized materiality" which we will discuss in our third paper.
In sum, the foundation of the implied materiality of a credit rating for an issuing company depends upon a CRA disclosing that its ratings are independent and unbiased, which is a material disclosure by the CRA itself. When this is the case, the market can rely upon a credit rating in much the way it can rely upon the information disclosed by a company. In contrast, when the CRA denies the claim that its ratings are independent and unbiased, or withdraws a prior such claim, questions naturally arise about the relevance of the rating and of the company providing it.
23 TSC Industries vs. Northway, Inc., op. cit., p. 449. 24 Ibid. The following sheds light on the linkage between "puffery" and immateriality:
The Cases of McGraw
Puffery refers to an exaggeration or statement that no reasonable person would take as factual. It often occurs in the context of advertising and promotional testimonials. Puffery may be used as a defense to a warranty or fraud claim, to assert that the plaintiff shouldn't have relied on the statements in issue. Puffing generally is defined as 'exaggerated, vague, or loosely optimistic statements about a company that are deemed so immaterial and unworthy of reliance that they cannot serve as the basis for liability.
The difference between a statement of fact and mere puffery rests in the specificity or generality of the claim. Hill asserted multiple times in each filing that they provided independent credit ratings or words to that effect. In 2012's Form 10-K, McGraw Hill reduced the frequency with which it claimed that it provides independent credit ratings, saying instead that McGraw Hill is a provider of credit ratings (removing the modifier "independent") and of "independent ratings benchmarks." 36 In McGraw Hill's 2012 and 2013 10-Ks, they also stated, immediately after the "strive" statement, that they seek to bring "transparency and independent insights to the markets we serve," or similar. In McGraw Hill's 2014 10-K, issued soon after the Settlement, the "transparency and independent insights" phrase was omitted. 37 While the Settlement document clearly releases McGraw Hill from any civil liability to the U.S. Government (with the exclusion of any such liabilities arising out of NRSRO obligations, cited above), or to the states that were party to the settlement "relating to any statement or activities concerning the integrity, objectivity, independence and lack of influence from business concerns of their activities in connection with the issuance, confirmation, and surveillance of ratings…," (Settlement section 4-i, pp.4-5, then sections 10-11, pp. 17-25), McGraw Hill was specifically not released from any liability related to its potential liabilities from "Any private right of action" (Settlement section 12-d, p.25). Therefore, investors in McGraw Hill, or classes of these investors, will evaluate the meaning of these changing statements in the company's 10-K as they might affect the "total mix" of information used to decide on whether to buy or sell (per TSC v. reveals that the company asserted multiple times in each Form 10-K that it provided independent credit ratings and independent assessments of credit risk. 41 However, in its 2008 Form 10-K filing and all subsequent ones, 42 Moody's has removed any and all statements claiming that its ratings are independent.
Conclusion and Next Steps
Despite multiple lawsuits 43 and investigations 44 in the short term, biased ratings represent a substantial systemic risk to the financial markets (and society at large) that merits serious attention. This is a critical issue for the financial markets that for decades have relied on credit ratings as integral to investment decision making. The specter of ratings that do not support their implied materiality because they are not independent and unbiased endangers the CRAs' social license to operate, the commercial viability of their current business model, and the overall health of the financial markets.
The first step in restoring the real and perceived integrity of credit ratings is to address the issue of material disclosures, a matter of substantial consequence to both investors in CRAs and to the companies whose debt issues they rate. This is an issue of corporate governance (the "G" in ESG), to be addressed by the boards of directors of CRAs, particularly McGraw Hill and Moody's given that they are publicly traded companies with a combined ratings' market share of over 80%. 49 These boards need to decide whether the claim that their ratings products are independent and unbiased is a material disclosure or not. If so, unequivocal statements to that effect 50 belong in these CRAs' Form 10-K filings to inform three significant audiences: those who invest in CRAs; those who invest in debt of companies rated by CRAs; and the boards and management of issuing companies whose cost of and access to capital is at stake.
If, on the other hand, the CRA boards deem that such ratings independence claims are no longer a material disclosure, all three significant audiences should be made aware of this fact and draw their own conclusions. Our view is that if this ratings independence claim is withdrawn or claimed to no longer be material, then the SEC needs to reconsider the NRSRO status granted to any CRAs that do not claim that the independent and unbiased nature of their ratings is a material disclosure. The potential effect that ratings independence claims have on maintaining their NRSRO registration is a serious governance issue for the boards of CRAs to consider.
In our second paper in this series, we will turn our attention to whether and how so-called nonfinancial environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues are taken into account when credit ratings are issued. Our starting hypothesis for data gathering and analysis is that credit ratings factor in "G" issues more than they do the "E" and "S" ones. Given that companies and investors are increasingly factoring in ESG issues in their own decision-making, it is worth considering whether the CRAs should as well through "layered materiality," in which they factor into ratings what companies and investors regard as material ESG issues.
49 See Table 1 . 50 For McGraw Hill, this means that they would also retract their puffery claim.
Our third paper will examine CRA ownership structures and business models. Much has been written about this, particularly on challenges to the issuer pays model, which has a number of inherent problems. The fact that little has changed and that the CRAs have been relatively impervious to these concerns is based, we believe, on "institutionalized materiality." Whatever their quality, credit ratings have taken on a life of their own. Organizations that issue debt securities are, in practice, nearly required to get one. Some types of investors in debt securities are constrained in only being able to invest in debt securities that have a rating of a "investmentgrade" or higher. As a result, extant institutional structures have made these ratings a material reality; even if the foundation for implied and layered materiality is missing. 
